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I. Introduction  
Among the many legal strategies for controlling corporate 
wrongdoing, gatekeeper liability is perhaps the most complex and 
difficult to justify. As conventionally understood, this strategy 
involves imposing liability on “gatekeepers”—actors such as 
lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants—for the wrongs of 
their corporate clients, thus giving gatekeepers incentives to use 
their power to monitor and to control, or at least to influence, the 
conduct of their corporate clients and thereby to deter 
wrongdoing by them.1 In business transactions, client wrongdoing 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. For helpful 
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 1. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs 
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 890 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, 
Corporate Liability Strategies] (“The first requisite for gatekeeper liability is, of 
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often takes the form of disclosure misstatements to investors. 
Gatekeeper liability is premised, first, on the ability of 
gatekeepers to influence their clients’ conduct.2 Second, it is 
premised on the incapacity of more direct forms of liability—
namely, individual and enterprise liability—to effectively deter 
wrongdoing by corporate entities.3 Third, it is premised on the 
inability of gatekeepers’ reputations and of other market 
mechanisms to appropriately shape gatekeepers’ conduct in the 
absence of liability.4 Fourth, and somewhat paradoxically, it is 
also premised on the adequacy of gatekeepers’ reputations—on 
the idea that gatekeepers can “stake” their reputations on the 
accuracy and completeness of their clients’ assertions to 
investors.5 
Other factors also complicate the design of conventional 
gatekeeper liability regimes. Gatekeepers often respond to new 
regimes with countermoves, seeking to comply with the law 
without honoring its spirit, which makes the task of delineating 
gatekeepers’ duties difficult.6 Gatekeepers’ incentives routinely 
                                                                                                     
course, an outsider who can influence controlling managers to forgo offenses.”); 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORGAN. 53, 62–66 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers] (discussing the monitoring function of gatekeepers). 
 2. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 890. 
 3. See id. at 868 (“[Gatekeeper liability] serves to remedy enforcement 
insufficiencies . . . .”); id. at 888 (“Enforcement insufficiency occurs when both 
enterprise and individual penalties fail to elicit sufficient compliance at an 
acceptable cost.”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting 
Lawyers To Improve The Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1019, 1048 (1993) (describing gatekeeper liability in the field of financial 
regulation as “at most, a supplement to the dominant form of regulation in the 
field: direct controls over financial intermediaries”). 
 4. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 94 (“[G]atekeeper liability 
is valuable only if both of these private alternatives [reputation and contractual 
arrangements] prove inadequate . . . .”).  
 5. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) (“[T]he investment banker 
rents the issuer its reputation. The investment banker represents to the 
market . . . that it has evaluated the issuer’s product and good faith and that it 
is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the innovation.”); see also 
JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 3 (2006) (“Central to this model [of gatekeepers] is the concept of 
reputational capital and the subsidiary idea that it can be pledged or placed at 
risk by the gatekeeper’s vouching for its client’s assertions or projections.”). 
 6. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 12, at 893–96 
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diverge from those of their employees and others who act on their 
behalf, a misalignment that gatekeepers’ clients may use to 
undermine the deterrent force of gatekeeper liability. 
Gatekeepers often have long-standing relationships with their 
clients and are beholden to them for fees, creating powerful forces 
that may counter the intended effects of gatekeeper liability. 
There is also the so-called multiple gatekeeper phenomenon in 
business transactions—in which multiple distinct gatekeepers 
serve clients, acting interdependently, rather than independently 
of one another, and forming “an interlocking and interacting web 
of protection” against corporate wrongdoing.7 Nevertheless, 
despite this complexity and these challenges, gatekeeper liability 
has become a popular strategy for controlling corporate 
wrongdoing, especially in business transactions.8 
The gatekeeper liability strategy has also attracted close 
scholarly attention. In Collaborative Gatekeepers,9 an important, 
recent contribution to this literature, Professor Stavros Gadinis 
and Mr. Colby Mangels draw on techniques that have been 
successful in anti-money laundering (AML) regulation to propose 
a regulatory strategy to induce gatekeepers to effectively deter 
client wrongs.10 Their strategy is designed to avoid many of the 
challenges facing conventional gatekeeper liability regimes.11 It is 
ambitious, original, and provocative. In this response, I assess the 
proposal’s likely effectiveness by first distinguishing it from 
conventional gatekeeping regimes and then assessing the extent 
to which it overcomes the common shortcomings of such regimes. 
I argue in favor of the proposal but suggest that its success is 
likely to depend on the particular ways in which it interacts with 
these (conventional) gatekeeping regimes—because the proposal 
is intended to be overlaid on these regimes, rather than to amend 
or replace them. I also explain how the proposal will, inevitably, 
                                                                                                     
(discussing difficulties with the design of gatekeepers’ duties).  
 7. Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1602 
(2010). 
 8. For an overview of contexts in which gatekeeper liability is used, see 
Coffee, supra note 5, at 103–07. 
 9. Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 797 (2016). 
 10. See id. at 893–910. 
 11. See infra notes 18–34 (discussing these challenges). 
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prove difficult to justify—not because it lacks justification, but 
because gatekeeper liability, by its nature, hinges on the 
satisfaction of numerous complex conditions that cannot be 
established—easily, or at all—at least to the satisfaction of those 
inclined to oppose new liability regimes. Nevertheless, Gadinis 
and Mangels’s proposal is so cautiously and richly developed, and 
its own potential shortcomings so frankly acknowledged and 
assessed, that it warrants close investigation in the settings in 
which it could be applied. 
II. The Proposal: Collaborative Gatekeepers 
Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels propose a regime 
inspired by requirements in AML regulation for banks to lodge 
suspicious activity reports with banking authorities.12 Under the 
proposed regime, which they would overlay on existing 
regulation,13 gatekeepers would be required to collaborate with 
regulators by reporting (to regulators) any conduct on the part of 
their clients that they suspect involves wrongdoing.14 
Gatekeepers would report anonymously, a feature designed to 
shield them from client retribution,15 and they would face civil 
liability for failing to report as required. If gatekeepers 
discharged this reporting duty, they would enjoy immunity from 
subsequent actions, both public and private, related to the 
content of their reports “provided they continue[d] to act in good 
faith.”16 Although gatekeepers might well intervene in a 
prospective business transaction in order to deter wrongdoing by 
their clients, such as by actively disrupting wrongdoing or by 
“closing the gate” on the transaction, what the duty requires is 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 869–74. 
 13. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels note that “the[ir] collaborative 
gatekeeping model simply adds a reporting obligation,” without suggesting that 
any existing laws be amended or replaced. Id. at 913. 
 14. See id. at 838 (“The central part of this Article’s proposal is a new 
obligation for gatekeepers: to file a report alerting regulators to suspicious 
activities by their clients.”). 
 15. See id. at 836 (noting that “[a]nonymity shields gatekeepers from 
clients’ objections”). 
 16. Id. at 910; see also id. at 836 (“In return for submitting their suspicions, 
gatekeepers gain immunity with regard to client misconduct.”). 
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simply for gatekeepers to report their suspicions about their 
clients’ activity to regulators, rather than to take other corrective 
or preventive action. The proposed technique is thus not 
gatekeeping as conventionally understood, but a novel, targeted 
technique intended to ensure a particular form of gatekeeper 
involvement in business transactions.17 
The proposed regime is also intended to sidestep many of the 
core challenges facing commonly existing gatekeeper liability 
regimes, which Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels describe as 
“conventional” regimes.18 First, gatekeeper liability regimes 
typically impose knowledge-based or fault-based duties on 
gatekeepers—standards that may invite strategic conduct by 
gatekeepers designed more to avoid liability than to halt client 
wrongdoing. They explain that scienter-based duties give 
gatekeepers incentives to “avert[] their gaze, so that they limit 
the chances of coming across information that would compromise 
their unawareness.”19 Fault-based gatekeeper duties are similarly 
problematic: although often “less demanding” than scienter-based 
duties, they “still require[] gatekeepers to turn away their clients 
only after evidence starts mounting against them.”20 Under either 
approach, therefore, gatekeepers “often find themselves tiptoeing 
around the red line of illegality, putting up a shield around their 
own liability, rather than worrying about the impact of their 
client’s actions for third parties and the financial system as a 
whole.”21 In consequence, Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels 
explain, “information that does not render gatekeepers 
knowledgeable or negligent, but could still offer helpful tips in 
investigations, never reaches enforcement authorities.”22 
                                                                                                     
 17. The proposal might even be considered a hybrid between gatekeeping 
and whistleblowing. It imposes potential liability on gatekeepers in a manner 
that effectively ensures a form of gatekeeper monitoring, while also requiring 
the disclosure of suspected wrongdoing to enforcement officials. 
 18. See id. at 806, 814, 847, 913 (referring to “conventional” gatekeeper 
liability regimes). 
 19. Id. at 821. 
 20. Id. at 823. 
 21. Id.; see also id. at 834–35 (“Not surprisingly, gatekeepers have directed 
their energy in clearly demarcating their knowledge or negligence, as the case 
may be, so that they can avoid liability.”). 
 22. Id. at 835. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels further note that 
“gatekeepers have an incentive to suppress this information, for fear that, if 
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To escape this concern, the proposal “effectively expand[s] 
the scope of [gatekeepers’] obligations beyond the safe haven of 
awareness to the unchartered territory of suspicions and 
doubts.”23 It does so by adding their new reporting regime to the 
existing framework.24 Under the new regime, gatekeepers must 
report when they “come across some indications that raise 
suspicions [about their clients’ conduct] that fall far short of 
confirming problems.”25 The duty would be harder to “game” than 
knowledge-based or fault-based duties, making gatekeepers more 
likely to comply with it than those conventionally articulated 
duties and potentially giving regulators more information and 
thus more effectively deterring wrongdoing than existing 
gatekeeper regimes operating alone. 
The second challenge concerns gatekeepers’ bonds with their 
clients. As a transaction progresses, these bonds can strengthen, 
diminishing the likelihood that the gatekeeper will interdict 
wrongdoing by its client and even increasing the risk that the 
gatekeeper will actively assist its client in wrongdoing. By 
effectively lowering the triggering event or threshold to 
“suspicion”—or, more accurately, by adding such a duty to the 
conventional regimes—the proposed regime makes it more likely 
that gatekeepers will not only be required to act, but be required 
to act sooner—“at a very early stage in the development of [the 
gatekeeper-client relationship],” before strong client bonds have 
been able to develop.26 The presumption is that gatekeepers are 
more likely to act against their clients early in relationships than 
after they have invested in these relationships and grown loyal to 
their clients.27 
Third, the interests of individuals acting on behalf of 
gatekeepers may diverge from those of the gatekeepers. In 
consequence, individual agents of a gatekeeper may find it 
                                                                                                     
found out, it might be considered incriminatory in hindsight.” Id. 
 23. See id. at 854 (describing the anti-money laundering laws on which the 
proposed regime is based, and therefore referring specifically to the obligations 
of “banks” rather than to those of “gatekeepers”). 
 24. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the reporting 
feature of Gadinis and Mangels’s proposal). 
 25. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 836. 
 26. Id. at 844. 
 27. Id.  
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cost-beneficial to acquiesce in client wrongdoing while the 
gatekeeper’s incentives are to oppose it.28 For example, a law firm 
partner may choose to overlook a key client’s wrongdoing to avoid 
losing that client’s business, even though in doing so he or she 
may be exposing the law firm to significant harm. Responding to 
this challenge, Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels suggest 
imposing liability for violations of the reporting duty on 
individual agents as well as on gatekeepers.29 They also suggest 
that gatekeepers might, in response to the proposed reporting 
duty, engage compliance officers to report suspicions, effectively 
“delinking” the reporting duty from the individuals most likely to 
have personal ties to clients and thus most likely to acquiesce in 
client wrongdoing.30 
The proposed regime also addresses the so-called multiple 
gatekeeper phenomenon that afflicts gatekeeper liability regimes. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the unitary gatekeeper rarely exists 
in corporate and securities transactions, even though the 
literature has generally modeled the liability of either a single 
gatekeeper or each of several gatekeepers independently of one 
another.31 Rather, gatekeepers are more accurately envisioned as 
acting interdependently and thus as forming an interlocking and 
interacting web of protection against corporate wrongdoing.32 
Effectively deterring client wrongdoing in a transaction may 
require multiple gatekeepers—each with distinct spheres of 
influence and expertise—to take precautions and to cooperate in 
doing so.33 By having gatekeepers all report to a single regulator, 
the Gadinis-Mangels proposal enables a single entity—the 
relevant regulator—to piece together fragmented information 
that no single gatekeeper possesses, to draw upon additional 
expertise as needed, and thereby to overcome the possibility of 
gatekeepers not cooperating when effective deterrence requires 
that they do so. Accordingly, gatekeepers that have “only partial 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 815–17. 
 29. See id. at 840 (”[I]ndividual employees may be subject to monetary 
penalties or other disciplining sanctions.”). 
 30. Id. at 845. 
 31. See Tuch, supra note 7, at 1589–91. 
 32. See id at 1591–1604. 
 33. For a more detailed discussion on the issue of multiple gatekeepers, see 
id. at 1601–04, 1622–23. 
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information” will report it to regulators, allowing regulators to 
“utilize their investigatory powers to extract valuable evidence” 
and possibly fill in the remaining pieces.34 
III. Assessment of the Proposal  
A. The Challenges of Conventional Gatekeeper Liability 
The proposal astutely responds to many of the limitations of 
gatekeeper liability regimes. By lowering the threshold at which 
gatekeepers must act, it requires vigilance by gatekeepers early 
in the transactional process, diminishing the chance that strong 
client bonds will lead gatekeepers and their representatives to 
acquiesce in client wrongdoing. By formulating that threshold in 
terms that gatekeepers are less likely to strategically defeat, such 
as by adopting a “head-in-the-sand” approach, the strategy 
promises greater gatekeeper vigilance than otherwise. And by 
feeding this information to a single party (a designated regulator) 
that has the potential to draw on additional expertise, as needed, 
the proposal attempts to correct for the fragmented nature of the 
gatekeeping net. 
To be sure, as Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels 
acknowledge, the proposed strategy cannot address all of the 
challenges facing conventional gatekeeper liability regimes, and 
it has potential shortcomings of its own. Under the proposed 
regime, gatekeepers might seek to comply with the reporting 
obligation in order to gain immunity but without providing useful 
information to regulators.35 Gatekeepers might have strong ties 
with clients that pre-exist the transaction in question, 
diminishing the promise of early reporting. Gatekeepers might 
find themselves torn between reporting on their clients and 
discharging duties, such as fiduciary duties, toward their 
clients36—potentially compromising the quality of their advice, 
                                                                                                     
 34. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 838. 
 35. See id. at 843 (“Strategically minded gatekeepers might wish to provide 
regulators with just enough facts so as to secure the immunity benefits, while 
also discouraging the regulator from actually conducting further 
investigations.”). 
 36. See id. at 844 (exploring the dynamics between “[s]uspicious activity 
reporting” and “the gatekeeper-client relationship”). 
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diminishing clients’ willingness to seek it, and reducing the 
economies of expertise that can arise where corporations turn to 
outside advisors. For their part, regulators might lack the 
competence necessary to piece together information fragments 
from multiple gatekeepers that point to wrongdoing, thus failing 
to correct for the presence of multiple gatekeeper on major 
transactions. Regulators might even fail to pursue wrongdoing 
clearly identified by a single gatekeeper, simply lacking the 
capacity to sift through the avalanche of new reports they receive.  
Collaborative Gatekeepers thoroughly and methodically 
assesses many of these objections, as well as others, to the 
proposal, explaining why the proposal nevertheless holds 
promise. Although, inevitably, I have different views on some 
issues than Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels, I find their 
arguments eminently reasonable. Indeed, what lends particular 
force to their arguments is their carefully documented case study 
of an analogous strategy operating in AML regulation. They show 
how that analogous strategy “was implemented with some 
success” and “grew[] stronger . . . in recent years”37 and how 
many of the risks that face their own proposal did not materialize 
under that strategy. There is good reason to think that the 
proposal would avoid many of the central problems afflicting 
gatekeeper liability.  
B. How the Proposal Interacts with Conventional Gatekeeper 
Liability 
1. Distinctive Features of the Proposal 
To fully assess the proposal, however, we must understand 
how it operates in combination with conventional gatekeeper 
liability regimes. Recall that the proposed strategy is overlaid on 
existing regulation, including conventional gatekeeper liability 
regimes. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels are clear that their 
strategy would not amend or replace existing gatekeeper liability 
provisions. For instance, core anti-fraud provisions in federal 
securities laws—including Section 11 of the Securities Act38 and 
                                                                                                     
 37. Id. at 893. 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). 
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Rule 10b-539 promulgated under Section 10 of the Securities 
Exchange Act40—would continue to apply.41 The proposal would 
“simply add[] a reporting obligation” to these and other existing 
liability rules.42 
What the proposal adds is a relatively narrowly tailored 
obligation. It requires gatekeepers to report when they suspect 
wrongdoing by their clients, not to take additional action that 
might disrupt or otherwise deter such wrongdoing. The proposal 
thus requires a particular form of gatekeeping intervention—
reporting to a designated regulator. The duty might require some 
probing by a gatekeeper of its client’s activities, but that would be 
to allow the gatekeeper to determine whether the client’s conduct 
in fact “raise[d] suspicions” within the scope of the duty.43 The 
duty would not require the gatekeeper to go further, such as to 
confirm or dispel its suspicions or even to take corrective action, 
but instead would be discharged when the gatekeeper reported its 
suspicions.44 
Conventional gatekeeper liability regimes, by contrast, 
typically require gatekeepers to take action beyond the reporting 
of suspicions to regulators. These actions, or precautions, 
represent the mechanisms through which gatekeepers exercise 
their influence over their clients. Generally speaking, such 
precautions include activities that affect the probability of their 
clients’ actually engaging in wrongdoing. In business 
transactions, precautions include measures to detect and prevent 
wrongdoing, such as conducting due diligence, discussing a 
client’s activities with its individual managers, and reviewing 
                                                                                                     
 39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 41. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 841 (suggesting that Rule 
10b-5 would continue to apply under the new regime). 
 42. Id. at 913; see also id. at 910 (“[I]f [gatekeepers] choose not to report 
promptly, then they will be subject to sanctions for failing to report, on top of 
any other violations they might be committing.”). 
 43. Id. at 837 (“Gatekeepers should evaluate this information and, if 
necessary, make additional inquiries to supplement their 
intelligence. . . . Through this process, gatekeepers could assess whether their 
clients’ conduct raises suspicions.”). 
 44. In fact, gatekeepers must file reports “even when they do not believe 
that their client is actually violating any laws”—provided they nevertheless 
suspect misconduct by the client. Id. at 844.  
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and revising disclosure documents intended for investors.45 In 
some cases, precautions would include “closing the gate” to a 
transaction, such as refusing to provide a written opinion on 
which completion of a deal is conditioned.46 
Accordingly, the proposed strategy is more narrowly 
circumscribed than conventional gatekeeper liability. Its 
requirements would be satisfied by gatekeepers submitting 
reports to regulators rather than by taking other precautions to 
deter wrongdoing by clients. By design, the strategy would be 
completed early in the transactional process,47 before many of the 
precautions contemplated by conventional gatekeeper liability 
regimes could occur. It would require gatekeepers to report their 
suspicions, empowering regulators to take corrective action 
rather than requiring gatekeepers themselves to take such 
action. 
2. Interpreting Immunity under the Proposal 
How would this proposal interact with conventional 
gatekeeper liability regimes? They are intertwined in a critical 
respect. Under the proposal, gatekeepers that discharge their 
reporting duty would gain immunity “from actions arising out of 
their reports by regulators and private investors alike, provided 
they continue to act in good faith”48—thus potentially immunizing 
gatekeepers from liability that they would otherwise face under 
existing gatekeeper liability regimes.49  
                                                                                                     
 45. For a discussion of due diligence activities, see Andrew F. Tuch, 
Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 365, 376–77 (2012). 
 46. Ronald Gilson observes that a “legal opinion is typically necessary to 
complete a placement of securities under the private offering exemption from 
registration under the Securities Act of 1933”; by “refusing to provide the 
necessary opinion,” a lawyer could exercise his capacity to control his client’s 
conduct—and, here, prevent misconduct. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the 
Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990). 
 47. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 838 (“[T]he proposal 
encourages gatekeepers to come forward at a much earlier stage.”). 
 48. Id. at 910.  
 49. See, e.g., id. at 842 (“T]he immunity attaches to the actions reported, 
irrespective of the specific statutes or rules violated [by the gatekeeper].”). 
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Consider the possible interpretations of this immunity 
through the application of Section 11 of the Securities Act and 
Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act to an initial public 
offering of securities, perhaps the quintessential gatekeeping 
context.50 Consider in this context an underwriter that reported 
to the relevant regulator its suspicions about its corporate client’s 
public disclosures (in the corporation’s registration statement) of 
off-balance sheet activities. Assume that by so reporting the 
underwriter discharged its reporting duty under the proposed 
regime. Assume also that the suspected wrongdoing eventuated—
the corporation’s registration statement materially misstated its 
off-balance sheet activities. Precisely what immunity would this 
gatekeeper receive? More specifically, to what extent would the 
underwriter be relieved of potential liability under the existing 
gatekeeper provisions, in particular Section 11 and Rule 10b-5? 
The answer depends on the interpretation given to the 
condition that the immunity apply “provided [the gatekeeper] 
continue[s] to act in good faith” after satisfying its reporting 
duty.51 Of course, we are assuming here that the required 
connection existed between the reported conduct and the 
eventual wrongdoing to satisfy the immunity’s requirement that 
the action “aris[e][] out of [gatekeepers’] reports.”52 
In interpreting the proposed immunity, one can imagine a 
spectrum of possibilities. At one extreme, the immunity could be 
given narrow effect, under which the underwriter would not 
easily be relieved of liability under the existing gatekeeper 
liability provisions, that is, Section 11 and Rule 10b-5. The 
proviso for underwriters to “continue to act in good faith” would 
require gatekeepers in fact to discharge their obligations under 
these anti-fraud provisions, effectively requiring gatekeepers to, 
                                                                                                     
 50. Although they regard their proposal as best suited to transaction types 
that are “standardized” or “relatively homogeneous,” and to wrongdoing that 
follows “standardized” or “well-trodden paths,” Professor Gadinis and Mr. 
Mangels argue for its use even in highly complex transactions. Id. at 894–95. 
Indeed, they show how the proposal would apply in settings that diverge widely 
in transactional complexity—the execution of trades by broker-dealers and the 
auditing of financial statements in securities offerings by accountants. 
 51. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 910. Professor Gadinis and Mr. 
Mangels also describe the immunity as applying “for reported actions provided 
[gatekeepers] submitted reports in good faith.” Id. at 841. 
 52. Id. at 910 (emphasis added).  
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for argument’s sake, continue with due diligence after reporting 
their suspicions to either dispel or confirm their suspicions and 
then to take additional precautions, including having the client 
revise its disclosures of off-balance sheet activities. 
Though this interpretation would ensure that gatekeepers 
continued taking precautions to deter the suspected wrongdoing 
even after having reported their suspicions, it would effectively 
require the underwriter in the hypothetical scenario to act as it 
would have acted under the conventional regime, except for the 
additional requirement that it would have to report its initial 
suspicions under the newly imposed overlay. So interpreted, the 
proposal would represent an additional cost to the underwriter, 
rather than potentially offering it relief from its existing 
obligations through the immunity. 
Such a narrow interpretation could even heighten the 
underwriter’s liability risks under the existing provisions.53 This 
possibility arises because of the importance under existing 
gatekeeper liability provisions of gatekeepers performing due 
diligence.54 Under Section 11, gatekeepers can avoid liability 
where they make out a so-called due diligence defense. Section 11 
subjects underwriters to strict liability for misstatements or 
omissions anywhere in a registration statement (other than in 
so-called expertised portions),55 unless they can establish a due 
diligence defense, which they can do by proving that “after 
reasonable investigation, [they had] reasonable ground to believe 
and did believe . . . that the statements therein were [not false or 
                                                                                                     
 53. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels suggest this possibility in general 
terms: 
[I]magine that you are advising a gatekeeper who has just come 
across indications of client misconduct. A comprehensive report of 
these indications immediately creates a record of the extent of 
gatekeeper suspicions at the time. If it turns out that the client is 
indeed committing fraud, victims will ask the court to evaluate this 
record ex post. Clearly, there is a risk that the court will . . . hold that 
the record meets the fault standard for gatekeeper liability . . . .  
Id. at 842. 
 54. This description of the liability framework is largely drawn from Tuch, 
supra note 7, at 1636–45. 
 55. These are parts of the registration statement purported to be 
authorized by an expert, such as an accountant, lawyer or other 
non-underwriter professional. 
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misleading].”56 Underwriters can also face liability in connection 
with expertised portions of registration statements, but here they 
benefit from a more generous defense than the due diligence 
defense. Known as the reliance defense, it omits any requirement 
for a “reasonable investigation”; it protects underwriters from 
liability where they prove they lacked a belief or reason to believe 
that the relevant statements were untrue or that there was a 
material omission.57 The due diligence defense is also relevant 
under Rule 10b-5, the broadest anti-fraud rule in the securities 
regulatory arsenal, because it tends to negate the existence of 
scienter58 and thus liability.  
In determining whether the due diligence defense has been 
established, courts have paid attention to the concept of “red 
flags” or “storm warnings.”59 These have been variously defined 
as “facts which come to a defendant’s attention that would place a 
reasonable party in [the] defendant’s position ‘on notice that the 
[issuer] was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its 
investors,’”60 and as any information that “strips a defendant of 
his confidence” in the accuracy and completeness of statements in 
relevant portions of a registration statement.61 Under Section 11, 
the existence of red flags may deprive a gatekeeper of the benefit 
of either the due diligence defense or the reliance defense under 
Section 11. For the due diligence defense, red flags will require 
                                                                                                     
 56. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 57. 15 U.S.C § 77k(b)(3)(C). Experts—that is, non-underwriter 
professionals such as auditors and lawyers—also face liability for misstatements 
or omissions in expertised portions of registration statements, but benefit from a 
due diligence defense. 
 58. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Statutory and Case Law Primer on Due 
Diligence Under the Federal Securities Law, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE 11, 
13 (1995). For example, in In re Software Toolworks Inc. v. Dannenberg, 50 F.3d 
615, 626–27 (9th Cir. 1994), the court explained as follows: “Because we 
conclude that the Underwriters acted with due diligence in investigating [the 
company’s business and revenues], we also hold that the Underwriters did not 
act with scienter [under § 10(b)] regarding those claims.” 
 59. See Tuch, supra note 7, at 1639 (“Red flags, or ‘storm 
warnings’ . . . . may be sufficient to deprive a gatekeeper of the benefit of either 
the due diligence or reliance defense.”). 
 60. In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (quoting In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002)). 
 61. Id. at 673. 
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the gatekeeper to “look deeper and question more” in order to be 
considered to have conducted a “reasonable investigation.”62 For 
the reliance defense, red flags will give the underwriter “reason 
to believe” an inaccuracy exists in the registration statement.63 
The risk for the underwriter under the proposed regime is 
that by reporting its suspicions early in a transaction, as 
required, it will be taken to have signaled the existence of “red 
flags” that are relevant in determining the reasonableness of its 
investigations—and thus whether it exercised due diligence—
under Section 11 and Rule 10b-5. If, as seems possible, its 
suspicions constituted “red flags,” the underwriter might well 
need to then probe further than it would otherwise, seeking to 
confirm or dispel its suspicions, in order to avoid liability under 
these existing gatekeeper liability provisions—potentially 
exposing the underwriter to greater liability risk than it might 
have faced in the absence of the newly proposed reporting regime. 
This narrow interpretation of the proposal’s immunity thus 
complicates the proposed strategy’s appeal. Under this 
interpretation, the reporting duty could add to gatekeepers’ 
burdens in two ways: first, by exposing them to liability for 
failing to report suspicious activity by their clients; and second, 
by increasing their expected liability under existing gatekeeper 
liability rules. In response, gatekeepers might be wary of lodging 
reports—and even more inclined to avoid knowledge of facts that 
might raise their suspicions than they would be otherwise. 
Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels describe the immunity as 
providing gatekeepers with an “important incentive” to report64 
and suggest that it could “allow [gatekeepers] to report all 
relevant facts and avoid unwanted legal and regulatory 
adventures”65—suggesting they intended a broader operation for 
the immunity. 
                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 677 (quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 
235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2002)). This is not to say that an 
underwriter’s precautions will necessarily satisfy the due diligence defense in 
the absence of red flags. Determining whether the due diligence defense is 
satisfied requires more than “a determination of whether any red flags existed 
that would put [the underwriters] on notice of a duty to make an inquiry of [the 
non-expertised portion of the registration statement in question].” Id. at 683.  
 63. Id. at 681.  
 64. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 841. 
 65. Id. at 842. 
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Consider then moving toward the opposite end of the 
interpretive spectrum and giving the immunity an expansive 
interpretation. Under such an interpretation, the underwriter 
that discharged its reporting obligation would in most cases be 
relieved of liability under existing rules, including Section 11 and 
Rule 10b-5—assuming, again, that the eventual client 
wrongdoing was connected with the gatekeeper’s reported 
suspicions (such that the wrongdoing “ar[o]se out of the 
[gatekeeper’s] report”). Applying recent corporate law authorities, 
the gatekeeper would fail to act in good faith (or, equivalently,66 
act in bad faith) and therefore fall afoul of the immunity’s proviso 
if it “intentionally fail[ed] to act in the face of a known duty to 
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for [its] duties.”67 Except 
in the (presumably) unusual case where bad faith was shown to 
exist—such as where the gatekeeper made no attempt at due 
diligence post-reporting—the gatekeeper that complied with its 
reporting duty would face no liability under conventional 
gatekeeper liability regimes. 
Such an interpretation would give the immunity far-reaching 
effect. It would provide gatekeepers with powerful incentives to 
report their suspicions and, therefore, provide regulators with 
much new and potentially useful information. Of course, on the 
other hand, such an interpretation could seriously undermine the 
force of existing gatekeeper liability provisions. If gatekeepers 
were largely protected from liability under conventional 
gatekeeper provisions for their post-reporting conduct once they 
discharged their reporting duty, they would have weaker liability 
incentives to take post-reporting precautions to deter client 
wrongdoing, although they would still have reputational 
incentives to take these precautions. 
This interpretation also complicates the proposed strategy’s 
appeal. As explained above,68 under conventional regimes, 
                                                                                                     
 66. While these concepts (bad faith and the failure to act in good faith) are 
not self-evidently equivalent, courts have treated them as generally equivalent. 
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 n.111 (Del. 2006); 
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (equating the concepts in analysis). 
 67. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (noting that, in these circumstances, a corporate 
director may be found to have breached his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty by 
failing to act in good faith). Other conduct regarded as bad faith includes 
conduct intended to violate applicable positive law. Id.  
 68. Supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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gatekeepers have incentives to take a range of precautions—
considerably broader than those contemplated by the proposal—
to deter client wrongdoing. A broad immunity may diminish the 
likelihood that gatekeepers will take precautions other than 
reporting their suspicions. For instance, it may diminish the 
likelihood that the hypothetical underwriter will either confirm 
or dispel any suspicions it has about its client and, ultimately, 
“close the gate” on the proposed IPO, such as by refusing to sign 
the underwriting agreement. It may also heighten risks 
associated with regulator incompetence or incapacity because it 
shifts the burdens of disrupting corporate wrongdoing onto 
regulators once gatekeepers have reported their suspicions and 
further requires regulators to determine whether gatekeepers 
have acted in good faith and thus come within the terms of the 
immunity. The precise scope of the immunity is thus critical to 
how the proposal would affect gatekeepers’ incentives. 
C. The Calibration of Gatekeeper Liability 
There are other complexities involved in assessing whether 
the proposal is justified, or desirable. As is well known, 
gatekeeper liability exists as part of a larger legal liability 
framework. In this framework, the relevant acts making up the 
wrongdoing are performed by the corporation or, more accurately, 
by an individual or individuals who act for or on behalf of the 
corporation. To (directly) deter that wrongdoing, liability can be 
imposed on the corporate enterprise, as well as on the 
corporation’s managers. Such liability creates incentives for the 
corporation and its managers to take precautions by exercising 
their control over the individual perpetrators. (Obviously, the 
individual perpetrators can face liability as well.)  
Gatekeeper liability supplements these more direct forms of 
liability for controlling corporate wrongdoing.69 In the commonly 
adopted paradigm, initially employed by Professor Reinier 
Kraakman in his pioneering work and now routinely used, 
gatekeeper liability regimes aspire to optimally deter 
wrongdoing, that is, to “yield the ‘right’ amount of compliance 
                                                                                                     
 69. See supra note 3.  
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with legal rules—bearing in mind that enforcing these duties is 
itself costly.”70 Thus, gatekeeper liability regimes find 
justification when both enterprise and individual liability “fail to 
elicit sufficient compliance at an acceptable cost.”71  
Still more must be shown to justify imposing liability on 
gatekeepers for the wrongdoing of their clients. Gatekeepers 
must have the capacity to monitor and to control, or at least to 
influence, the conduct of their clients and thereby to deter 
wrongdoing by them.72 Because gatekeepers’ reputations may 
provide powerful incentives for them to disrupt wrongdoing, even 
in the absence of gatekeeper liability, these forces must—in 
combination with more direct forms of liability—fail to “yield the 
‘right’ amount of compliance with legal rules,”73 such that further 
incentives for gatekeepers to oppose wrongdoing would be 
desirable. Gatekeepers’ reputations must also be substantial 
enough that they can be “staked” by gatekeepers on the accuracy 
and completeness of their clients’ assertions.74 Making the case 
for gatekeeper liability—and justifying extensions to it—is thus 
fraught with complexity. 
This complexity of a conventional gatekeeper liability regime 
arises from the interdependencies between gatekeeper liability 
and both direct liability mechanisms and market-based 
incentives.75 Gatekeeper liability serves to supplement these 
other forces for deterring wrongdoing, and is justified only where, 
together with them, it deters corporate wrongdoing more cost 
effectively than alternative regimes.76 As Reinier Kraakman has 
explained, “the task is to pick the optimal joint strategy.”77 In 
theory, it is thus not enough for gatekeeper liability to deter 
                                                                                                     
 70. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 857–58. 
Professor Kraakman cites as authority for this statement Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL’Y ECON. 169 (1968) and 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289 (1983). 
 71. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 888–89. 
 72. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (emphasizing this 
requirement for liability). 
 73. Supra note 70. 
 74. Supra note 5. 
 75. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 55. 
 76. See id. at 88. 
 77. Id. at 87–88 (emphasis added). 
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greater harm than the costs it imposes; rather, because 
gatekeeper liability regimes are inseparable from direct liability 
rules and market-generated incentives, gatekeeper liability will 
only be justified when it and the deterrent measures that it 
supplements produce benefits (reduced wrongdoing) that cannot 
“be purchased more cheaply.”78 
Though the proposed strategy may well avoid many of the 
shortcomings of conventional gatekeeper liability regimes, its 
desirability seems likely to hinge on an especially complex 
calculus. Would the proposal’s benefits—its additional deterrent 
force—more than offset its costs? Answering this question will 
require a precise articulation of the scope of the proposal’s 
immunity. Even if the proposal’s cost-benefit comparison is 
favorable, the harder question is why policymakers should resort 
to the proposed regime to bolster the existing deterrence of 
corporate wrongdoing, rather than to alternative measures such 
as tightening up existing liability regimes by increasing sanctions 
on corporate wrongdoers or on the individual perpetrators acting 
on their behalf. In examining these questions, policymakers 
would need to predict gatekeepers’ likely response to the proposed 
regime; would they, for example, adopt contractual risk-shifting 
devices to shift the incidence of liability—such as requiring their 
clients to indemnify them for liability under the regime?79 How 
would clients respond? Because they control the selection and 
involvement of gatekeepers, might clients simply distance 
gatekeepers from their business dealings or decide to “make” 
rather than “buy” gatekeeping services by bringing gatekeepers 
within the boundaries of the firm? How effective will regulators 
be in disrupting wrongdoing that gatekeepers suspected and 
reported? Policymakers would also need to consider, in addition 
                                                                                                     
 78. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 866; see also 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 87–88 (“Gatekeeping might yield 
enforcement benefits and still be a poor strategy if, for example, additional 
penalties directed against wrongdoers could avert the same harm more 
cheaply.”). 
 79. Gatekeepers face incentives to adopt risk-shifting measures. See 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 859–62 (noting that 
gatekeepers can avoid liability by shifting risks). In securities transactions they 
routinely adopt such measures. See Tuch, supra note 7, at 1646 (“In response to 
potential liability under Section 11, underwriters routinely adopt risk-shifting 
arrangements with other gatekeepers, namely accountants and lawyers.”). 
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to the proposal’s basic costs—e.g., the costs of enforcement (public 
and private) and the costs of compliance for law-abiding 
corporations80—the proposal’s effects on existing liability regimes, 
including, for example, whether they may reduce the deterrent 
force of existing regimes (as they would seem to do under a broad 
interpretation of the immunity).  
As now-Justice Stephen Breyer has observed, “to know that 
change [to an industry or regulation] is truly desirable and 
practical[,] the problem must be investigated further—
empirically and in depth.”81 New studies will often be required, 
because existing studies often lack adequate information.82 The 
complex analysis required to justify imposing gatekeeper liability 
invites scientific precision, and yet will inevitably rest on 
judgments that will be political and contested. The analysis will 
be complicated by the interactions between the proposal and 
conventional gatekeeper liability regimes. The apparent success 
of a similar reporting-based regime in AML regulation provides 
some comfort, although one may question how generalizable that 
experience is to other financial settings.83 The proposal will prove 
difficult to justify—not because it lacks justification, but because 
gatekeeper liability, by its nature, hinges on the satisfaction of 
numerous complex conditions that may not be easily established. 
Nevertheless, while it is not clear how the assessment of the 
proposal would come out in the settings in which the proposal 
could apply, there is more than enough in Collaborative 
Gatekeepers to regard this novel proposed strategy as not only 
feasible but deserving further serious inquiry. 
                                                                                                     
 80. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 878 
(discussing the costs of liability regimes).  
 81. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 318 (1982). 
 82. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 318–19. 
 83. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels regard their proposal as best suited 
to transaction types that are “standardized” or “relatively homogeneous,” and to 
wrongdoing that follows “standardized” or “well-trodden paths,” but also argue 
for its use even in highly complex transactions, including those that may differ 
significantly from transactions subject to AML regulation. Id. at 894–95. 
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IV. A Possible Extension 
I conclude by briefly suggesting an extension to the 
Gadinis-Mangels strategy to address one of the dangers of the 
multiple gatekeeper phenomenon.84 The concern here is not that 
multiple information fragments need to be pieced together (a 
concern the proposal addresses), but that suspicions will not 
arise—to trigger the reporting requirement—unless information 
is first pooled or expertise first combined. This concern arises 
from the specialization of gatekeepers and the possibility that 
suspecting wrongdoing that is underway may require the 
combined specialized skills of multiple gatekeepers. This concern 
would be greatest with complex, low-visibility wrongs. It is 
possible that no single gatekeeper (acting unilaterally) would 
possess the knowledge or expertise required to suspect 
wrongdoing that is afoot in circumstances where multiple 
cooperating gatekeepers would indeed suspect such wrongdoing. 
I briefly propose a possible solution to this problem as food 
for thought. It involves imposing the proposed reporting duty not 
on all gatekeepers, but on a single gatekeeper—the anointed 
“best briber.”85 In a securities transaction, especially with regard 
to defects in non-expertised portions of the registration 
statement, this could be the underwriter. Putting liability on the 
underwriter alone to report suspicions and holding it responsible 
for reporting wrongdoing that could have been suspected by 
multiple gatekeepers would provide powerful incentives for the 
underwriter to ensure it possesses the expertise required (such as 
by employing lawyers and auditors), thus acting much like a 
multi-disciplinary gatekeeper. To the extent it does not (or 
cannot) do this, it could rely on other gatekeepers—as it typically 
does in a securities transaction. What it normally does is employ 
risk-shifting devices—such as so-called “comfort” or “negative 
assurance” letters—designed to ensure that the gatekeepers on 
which it relies are liable to it to the extent it faces liability for 
wrongdoing.86 But for this regime to work, the underwriter would 
                                                                                                     
 84. Supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 85. This is likely to be the actor that can most cheaply coordinate with 
other gatekeepers in order to reduce the costs of wrongdoing. GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 150 (1970).  
 86. For a description of these risk-shifting devices among gatekeepers on 
640 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 619 (2017) 
need to face liability not only for its conduct, but also for the 
conduct of the gatekeepers on which it relied. Then it would have 
incentives to ensure that those other gatekeepers passed on 
relevant information or used the right expertise—so effectively 
that, though distinct, they operated as a single multi-disciplinary 
gatekeeper, thus overcoming the defects associated with the 
fragmentation of the gatekeeping net. This preliminary proposal 
addresses potentially troubling products of the multiple 
gatekeeper phenomenon—the opportunity it creates for clients to 
disaggregate their work among multiple gatekeepers for the 
purpose of minimizing the ability of any individual gatekeeper to 
deter or suspect wrongdoing and, for that matter, for gatekeepers 
themselves to narrow their scope of services or alleged expertise 
to avoid responsibility for wrongdoing that, with a broader focus 
or help from other gatekeepers, they might have suspected. This 
suggestion is premised on the idea that gatekeepers are in the 
best position to apportion liability among themselves.  
V. Conclusion 
Conventional gatekeeper liability regimes face formidable 
challenges. They are hard to justify and to design. Professor 
Gadinis and Mr. Mangels’s ambitious proposal deftly navigates 
this terrain. Their proposal is rooted in precedent and yet novel 
in application. Whether it is justified in particular settings must 
be left for future work to determine, but there is more than 
enough promise in the proposal to warrant scholars and 
policymakers pursuing the research agenda that Collaborative 
Gatekeepers has laid out. 
 
                                                                                                     
securities transactions, see Tuch, supra note 7, at 1645–48. 
